Abstract
Introduction
Social classes and social groups played a significant role in the nationalisation of the masses. Therefore, nationalisms are not only intellectual and political projects or currents, but also social phenomena and movements with a varied social base and dynamics. This is a long-neglected aspect of Turkish historiography. Studies on Turkey still focus, to a great extent, on the ideas and acts of political leaders, organisations and intellectual figures. For this reason, I position the nationalist social mobilisations in relation to the transformation of mass politics in the Ottoman Empire. 1 In this article, I will focus on different mobilisation patterns in order to understand and analyse the elimination of the Greek Orthodox population at the beginning of twentieth century. To this end, I will first touch upon the emergence and transformation of modern social mobilisation patterns throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Ottoman Empire. Second, I will highlight the reason why it is crucial to take into account such phenomena in Turkish historiography. Third, I will depict how different patterns of social mobilisation played their part in the liquidation of Greeks, both economically and demographically. Finally, I will highlight throughout the narrative how different sections of society used nationalist mobilisations and various repertoires of collective actions as an opportunity structure to promote their particular interests.
In order to depict and analyse the mobilisation patterns and the relationship between the Greek Orthodox Population, the Muslim community and the Ottoman state, I make use of a variety of documents from numerous sources. Firstly, I have used Greek sources from the Greek Foreign Ministry Archives (aye) and news and articles from different contemporary Greek periodicals. In addition, I also used Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, the official journal of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. Secondly, I make use of abundant documents from the Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (boa), and news and articles from various contemporary Turkish periodicals. I also refer to the Records of the Parliament (mmzc) and different pamphlets and leaflets written by civil initiatives in Turkish. Finally, in order to compare the information I gathered from Turkish and Greek sources I also searched the Foreign Ministry Archives of Great Britain (fo) and France (cpc).
Social mobilisation in the age of mass politics
As is widely accepted in the literature, a modernisation process deeply influenced the Ottoman state and society in the course of the nineteenth century. The modernisation efforts of the state elite and the incorporation of the empire into the world economy were the main initiators of this fundamental change. The expansion of market relationships within the empire, the commercialisation and commodification of daily life and social relationships, the formation of middle and professional classes, the construction of modern communication technologies, the emergence of a modern education system, the expansion of the daily press and various kinds of periodicals, the rise of different social and political networks, organisations and associations, were all different aspects of this transformation in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state started to intervene in the daily life of its subjects and became interested in various social and economic issues that previously had been left in the hands of local communities. As is the case in many different countries, social control of the population became an administrative concern for the modern state and, to this end, the Ottoman state utilised modern devices, established new institutions and made use of modern techniques of governance in order to cope with the new demands of politics. Therefore, the relationship between state and society in the Ottoman Empire altered drastically during the nineteenth century. As a result of this general transformation in the political, social and economic spheres, new governing practices were adopted to win the approval, consent and support of the ordinary people and to legitimise the political and social system. The sultans of the Ottoman Empire started to represent themselves not as semi-divine monarchs, but more as paternalistic father figures who looked after the well-being of their subjects. 4 Therefore, obtaining the loyalty of ordinary citizens as well as that of other power holders in society became significant for the rulers. The public opinion of the Ottoman society became something that had to be taken into account in the making of imperial policies.
5 For this reason, the Ottoman state began to explore new policies, such as social welfare, in order to obtain the consent of the Ottoman public. 6 Social mobilisation emerged in the course of the nineteenth century and is one of the fundamental pillars of modern mass politics. The participation of different sections of society, social classes and ordinary people in politics diversified the instruments of mainstream politics. New forms and patterns of mobilisation developed as broad sections of the population became involved in politics and public life. The expansion of the public sphere and the flourishing of civil society facilitated the development of this new trend. The invention of national and imperial celebrations, public charities, different acts of benevolence, and the emergence of political symbols, elections, boycotts, strikes, mass entertainments such as theatre and sporting activities, mass spectacles and pageants were all crucial instances and elements of this transformation.
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There are different patterns of social mobilisation in modern mass politics; although one may find various ways of classifying social mobilisation, a rough division into two basic categories is enough to clarify my argument. The first pattern is mobilisation from above, in which state and ruling elites try to enhance the stability and legitimacy of the political system and social order. (The mobilisation of people from above itself has two variants: a passive statement of consent, and active participation at grassroots level.) The second pattern is mobilisation from below, in which different sections of society find an opportunity to put forward their own agenda in the expanding public sphere.
Until the 1908 Revolution, direct actions and grassroots mobilisation of ordinary people in the streets was not an intended outcome of mobilisation efforts on the part of the elites. It came about only as a result of spontaneous lower class activism, as in the cases of mutinies, insurrections and uprisings of peasants, workers, artisans and the lower classes in general. The congregation of crowds in public spaces was not the desired outcome of mass politics; rather, the official policy was to encourage mass manifestations of state pride and loyalty to the sultan. 8 The masses were kept passive and motionless: it was their duty to manifest their compliance, as in the well-known slogan "Padişahım Çok Yaşa!" (Long Live the Sultan!) However, the 1908 Revolution, which is known as the Yong Turk Revolution, paved the way for a new era for mobilisation practices that acquired clear-cut characteristics and features. First, the revolution and the promulgation of the constitution for the second time in Ottoman history provided a political opportunity for different sections of society, including the lower classes, to represent themselves in public spaces. On the one hand, the revolution allowed the spontaneous mobilisation and activism of ordinary people, who made their interests manifest in strikes, elections, boycotts, and demonstrations. On the other hand, the new elite of the young constitutional regime was also in favour of the direct participation of different social groups in politics. A controlled mobilisation of the Ottoman people enhanced their position vis-à-vis the old regime. As the studies that have collected visual material on the 1908 Revolution clearly depict, the most spectacular aspect of the revolution and the Second Constitutional Period was the gathering of crowds in public spaces. After the revolution, nationalist celebrations, civil organisations, voluntary associations, social movements and a flourishing daily press endowed the popular and middle classes with an opportunity to express their interests in the public sphere. Mass parades, public meetings, demonstrations and direct actions became the central pillars of mainstream politics. The Second Constitutional Period that started after the promulgation of the constitution in 1908 was also an era of wars. The 1911-1912 Ottoman-Italian War, the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, followed by World War One, entailed the total mobilisation of the home front. It was no longer only the armies that were at war; societies themselves were also involved in the conflict behind the front line. 10 However, as mentioned above, although various social groups and classes, including merchants, notables, artisans, low-rank bureaucrats or officials, workers and women from various social backgrounds, all played their part in the history of modern Turkey, they do not show up in most of the historical narratives. Today, both nationalist and revisionist liberal historiography, as well as popular literature on Turkish history, ignore social movement and mobilisation practices altogether. This is related to the poverty of social history studies on the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. Although a number of seminal studies on social history have been published, and their quantity is increasing, they are still marginal in the literature. Furthermore, their influence on the intellectual milieu is comparatively weak. The historical narratives still take the political and military elite to be the only actors in history.
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Contrary to the general trend in the historiography on Turkey, in this paper I will examine the patterns of social mobilisation of the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire against the Greek Orthodox population. Although I do not deny that the policies and politics of nationalist organisations and the Turkish/Muslim elite played decisive roles in history, I will depict how social movements and mobilisation practices in their various forms constitute the other side of the story, and how different patterns of mobilisation became influential weapons in the elimination and liquidation of Greek Orthodox from the empire. Since the elimination of non-Muslims is one of the crucial aspects of modern Turkey's social history, one should not be content with focusing solely on the political history.
Mass demonstrations, direct actions, grassroots politics and general mass mobilisation are important, both because of their place in the emergence of nationalism and the nation state, and because of their link to the general social and economic transformation. In the second half of the nineteenth century, particular problems of religious and ethnic communities and interests of social classes turned out to be public issues that were no longer restricted to a particular place and social group. Ethnic, religious, regional and national problems were no longer confined to intellectual circles, but started to affect the daily routines of ordinary people. This was part of a process of nationalisation of the masses and, as a result, ethnic conflicts also turned into massive clashes. For this reason, I will now focus on the main elements of the collective action and social mobilisation repertoire of Muslim/Turkish nationalism; namely, public meetings and demonstrations to protest foreign powers, boycotting of non-national merchandise and direct actions such as picketing, destruction of property and pogroms. This collective action repertoire was effectively utilised in the elimination of the Greeks from the empire, and in these different patterns of social mobilisation one can observe ordinary people in action.
Meetings became one of the main means of protests in the Ottoman Empire during the Second Constitutional Period. This meeting above is a protest against the independence of Bulgaria.

The Greek population as a target
There were many and various problems between Muslims, the Ottoman state and the native Greek Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the direct targeting and elimination of Greeks started with the boycott movement against Greece. 12 The difference between native Greeks and the Hellenes of Greece started to evaporate. The boycott movement had its origins in the Cretan Question. There were many insurrections and upheavals in Crete, and the island gained different levels of autonomy from the Ottoman Empire over the course of the nineteenth century. 13 After the 1908 Revolution, the desire of the Cretan Assembly and Greek nationalists on the island to unite with Greece caused a reaction in the Ottoman Empire.
14 This reaction paved the way for a strict boycott against Greece in 1910. However, the boycott of Greece was a delicate issue, since it was not easy to discern the Greek state from the native Greek citizens of the Ottoman Empire. The boycott officially targeted the Hellenes, the citizens of the Greek state, and their assets. The native Greeks of the empire, the Rum, were exempted. Yet, as the Ottoman Greek community and the patriarchate repeatedly asserted, they were also deeply affected by this movement, since the two groups had profound and intimate relationships with each other.
The boycott declarations, particularly in Selanik/Thessaloniki and Istanbul/Constantinople, emphasised that it was the Greeks of Greece (Yunanlı/ Yunani), not the Ottoman Greeks (Rum), who should be boycotted, and they wanted the Ottoman public to distinguish between them. 15 Yet, it was not easy to do so. Many Greek merchants held the passports of foreign countries because of the capitulations and the resulting economic advantages, and Greece was one of these countries. For this reason, the Greek newspaper Proodos claimed that they were almost impossible to distinguish. Furthermore, the newspaper asserted that the goods imported from Greece were sold in the stores of the Ottoman Greeks, many Ottoman Greeks were employed by Hellenes, and the Greek citizens of these two neighbouring countries were not only linked to each other by economic networks, but also by family ties. 16 Ottoman statesmen such as Mahmud Muhtar, Governor-General of İzmir/ Smyrna, warned boycotters of this intimate relationship between the Yunani and Rum. 17 Furthermore, many native Greeks in the empire did not have official civil registration, since they wanted to avoid taxes. Hence, discerning who was an Ottoman Greek and who was not gave rise to problems between boycotters and the Greek community. The attitudes of local branches of the boycott organisations and network could also differ from the views of those at the centre. For instance, boycotters in Antalya who were picketing Greek stores declared that they were boycotting all philhellenic Greeks. This definition of Greekness as a target might also include natives, since it was an ambiguous claim in itself. 18 In a similar vein, the Boycott Society of İzmir/ Smyrna complained about those who were raised with the idea of a larger Greece, and it was therefore not only against Greece, but also against those who had a "Greek mentality."
19 For this reason, Ottoman Greek newspapers like Proodos were also accused of being advocates of the Greek national idea.
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The Ottoman government was alarmed by the possibility of a clash between different communities of the empire and sent three orders to the ministries and all provinces stating that a discourse based on Islam versus Christianity was contrary to the general interest of the empire. In its third order, the government underlined the fact that the protest against Greece was expanding to the economic activities of Ottoman citizens and their shops. 21 Because of this, this time the government wanted its order to be published in the Ottoman press. 22 During the boycott movement the Ottomanness of native non-Muslims came under suspicion, and they were asked to prove their patriotism. Georgios Bousios (Boşo Efendi), the member of parliament from Serfiçe/Servia, criticised this state of affairs, in which every non-Muslim was considered to be a potential subject of Greece. the district of Dedeağaç/Alexandroupolis, complained that the flour he sent via an Ottoman steamship to Nikola Pavlo, an Ottoman citizen in Kavala, was boycotted. The governors of Drama and Salonica informed the Ministry of the Interior that he was boycotted due to his Greek citizenship. The Ottoman government certified and confirmed Yani's Ottoman citizenship, yet this official approval did not rescue him: his product was boycotted again with the same claim in the same week, this time in Gümülcine/Komotini and some other towns of Edirne province. He sent a further telegram asking for help after thanking the government for its intervention in the previous case. He continued to have trouble, although he had received a document that proved his Ottoman citizenship from the Dedeağaç Chamber of Commerce. 24 In a report sent by the governor of Aydın to Istanbul it was admitted that a cigarette paper brand was boycotted in Manisa, even though its owners were Ottoman citizens. 25 A different telegram from İzmir/Smyrna on the picketing of Greek stores reported that there were Ottoman shops among those that had to be closed down because of the blockades. 26 Although there were many similar instances in which non-Muslims suffered during the boycott movement, they were not openly and officially targeted until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and were still included by other Ottomans in the definition of "us". However, after the Balkan Wars, things changed drastically. The loss of lands and defeat at the hands of former subjects was a trauma for Muslim/Turkish society and its elite. Furthermore, the flow of Muslim immigrants from the lost lands, and their miserable condition at the hands of the co-religionists of native Christians, had a deep impact on Muslim/Turkish nationalism, which was eventually to gain unprecedented power. The non-Muslims no longer formed part of the economic and social networks or the definition of a common identity. 27 The boycott, picketing, direct actions and violence started to target non-Muslims directly and openly, and nationalists began propagating Muslim/Turkish domination in the economy and in the empire. Thousands of pamphlets and leaflets were distributed in Istanbul and the provinces, blaming non-Muslims for betraying the country. 28 These pamphlets argued that non-Muslims were "sucking the blood of Muslims", and Muslims who shopped with them were "financing the bullets that kill their co-religionists" in the Balkans. These pamphlets were addressed to Muslims and Turks. 29 These ideas became prevalent among the Turkish intelligentsia and were expressed not only in pamphlets and periodicals, but also at public meetings and conferences. Behçet Salih, Mahmut Halit and Mustafa Muzaffer, medical students, gave public lectures in Aydın province, and expressed similar thoughts at one of these: "The Christians, profiting from our ignorance [...] these vipers whom we are nourishing have been sucking out all the life-blood of the nation. They are the parasitical worms eating into our flesh whom we must destroy and do away with [...]"
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Social mobilisation repertoire of early Muslim/Turkish nationalism Having described how the Greek Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire was targeted during the Second Constitutional Period, I will now examine how the process of their elimination was carried out. To this end, I will focus on different patterns of mobilisation and how different sections of the society (workers, consumers, merchants, notables, artisans, bureaucrats, low-ranking officials) participated in it. As mentioned before, after the 1908 Revolution, public meetings and demonstrations became one of the main elements of the collective action repertoire of Turkish nationalism. Anti-Greek mobilisation involved hundreds of these meetings in the main public spaces of the empire. Different kinds of meetings were convened: some of these were spontaneous congregations of protesting and marching people, while others were well-organised, pre-arranged conventions. The contemporary press was full of reports of these meetings against Greece. Most of these meetings, marches and demonstrations stirred up other kinds of mobilisation, such as volunteer-enlisting initiatives. People protested against Greece, numerous patriotic speeches were made and meetings sent telegraphs to parliament, the Ottoman government and foreign embassies. Hundreds of these telegraphs arrived from public meetings all over the empire in such numbers that parlia- ment decided not to read out the texts, but only the places that they were sent from, in order to spare valuable parliamentary time. 31 Foreign consuls claimed that most of these meetings were organised by a central political initiative. For them, they were more or less identical; speeches were held in different local languages and the way they were organised was similar, such as the sequence, parades, slogans, etc. French and British consuls considered these demonstrations to be secretly organised by the Ottoman government or the Committee of Union and Progress (cup). For them, these meetings had the air of artificiality, and the crowds that came together in the public squares, particularly the lower classes, were shepherded by the political elite. 32 This point of view was partly true: to a great extent the cup supported such meetings, and in many places directly organised them. Yet, on the other hand, the mobilisation of people on the streets always had a certain spontaneity and autonomy. For instance, the people who convened in Mihalıçık in the province of Ankara demanded that the Ottoman government take action against the union of Crete with Greece. They announced that they had started to enlist volunteers, and were going to meet at Sarıköy train station with other patriots. The leader of the meeting said that they were going to seize the train station and would not depart from the station's telegraph office until the Ottoman state reassured them regarding the Cretan issue. The Ministry of the Interior was alarmed and the Governor-General had to use the gendarmerie to disperse the crowds.
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The Ottoman government usually took an interest in meetings that triggered the mobilisation of the masses, or direct actions, or at least activities that had the potential to cause a loss of official control on society. Thus, when the people at the meeting in Kula in the province of Aydın declared that they would form a large unit in order to punish and get rid of those who infuriated and terrorised the Ottomans, the government asked the governor to put a stop to such initiatives. 34 Most of the meetings lasted one day. However, in some places, the duration and number of meetings increased over a short time. For instance, at Margiliç in the province of Yanya/Ioannina, the meetings started with the beating of drums and waving of flags, and continued with the enlisting of volunteers, but did not come to an end. After three days of mobilisation, some of the volunteers planned to march towards the centre of the province, and the excitement and agitation continued at a high level. The Governor-General ordered the local governor to disperse the people by force if necessary, asking him to reassure people that the government had the power to defend the Ottomans of Crete. 35 It is not clear if the crowd in Margiliç was dispersed by force, but that was definitely the case in Kuşadası/Scala Nuova in Aydın province, where the gendarmerie used bayonets to disperse a crowd who blockaded a Greek ship in the port.
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The mobilisation during the meeting in Adapazarı did not subside quickly either, and because of this the Ministry of the Interior asked the governor to move from İzmit to Adapazarı in order to deal with the masses. The governor (mutasarrıf) informed the government that the level of excitement had diminished after he had contacted the local governor (kaymakam) and the notables via telegram, but the central government was not satisfied with his reports and sent him to Adapazarı. The report that he sent from Adapazarı clearly depicts the mobilisation of different segments of society. On arrival, he became aware that the town was full of peasants; but it was not only the peasants or the lower ranks, but also the town's notables and prominent persons who had convened in order to demonstrate on behalf of the Ottoman Empire's rule in Crete. The emotions of the crowd were galvanised; yet, thanks to the imam's calming sermon during the Friday prayer, the 30,000 people acted in a restrained manner. However, although the meeting in general was temperate, the crowd's decisions were daring and audacious: if the government showed any kind of weakness in defending Crete (which was claimed to represent the honour of the Ottomans), the people would stand up and take action.
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At first, the anti-Greek mobilisation was based to a certain extent on peaceful actions, such as demonstrations and boycotting activities. The main motivation was to protest and abstain from consuming Greek merchandise. However, these collective actions were not totally immune from various forms of violence, as mentioned above. Besides the refusal to consume certain goods, two other types of obstacle were also utilised: picketing and ostracism. Public criers (tellals) were used to announce boycotting targets, but they were not employed solely for this purpose, but also to guard and closely watch the picket lines. For instance, in Akhisar in the province of Aydın (today in Manisa), boycotters recruited tellals and put guards outside the Greeks shops and stores to prevent customers from entering. As a result, some Greek shops were shut down and they were eliminated from economic life. 38 Similarly, in the Muslim quarter of Smyrna, watchmen were appointed to keep prospec- tive customers away from Greek stores. Shops were also identified with special marks in order to help Muslims recognise their Greekness. 39 The Greek community were still complaining about these watchmen in 1914. The metropolitan bishop of Ephesus reported that watchmen were placed in front of the doors of Christian butchers in Niksar and Parthenio. 40 Sokratis Prokopiou mentions in his memoirs that in Uşak, Muslims were harassed by watchmen with sticks and knifes if they attempted to enter Greek shops. The Greek names were erased from signboards. 41 The refugees from Crete and the Balkans were also active participants in this anti-Greek mobilisation. In their articles for this special issue, Emre Erol and Uğur Ümit Üngör also highlight the fact that refugees played significant roles in anti-Christian mobilisation. For instance, groups of Muslim Cretans in Antalya, Smyrna, Kala-i Sultaniye and Beirut marched through the streets of these cities, compelling Greeks to shut their shops down or damaging their properties. 42 The picketing of Greek stores by the boycotters and Muslim Cretans was one of the most frequently mentioned facts about anti-Greek mobilisation in the Greek press or in Greek consular reports. 43 Besides the picketing of stores, there were also inspection teams that investigated boycotted Greek merchandise in the shops. Boycott inspectors found Greek brandy in a Jewish grocery shop in Salonica and destroyed it all, and when the Jewish owner tried to resist he was severely beaten. 44 Apart from tellals, picket lines, watchmen and guards, the anti-Greek movement made use of posters, stickers, signboards and placards in order to enhance and publicise its actions. "Yunanlıdır"("it is Greek") was written in chalk over the entrance of the Bank of Anatolia, and it took a month for the bank to remove the sign. 45 The posters hung on the walls and windows of the shops facilitated the blockade of Greek business and kept customers away. In one of its declarations published in İttihad, the Boycott Society of Smyrna told Ottomans not to buy from Greek stores that were marked. 46 These actions badly damaged the Greek business network in the empire, particularly after 1910, and devastated it in 1914. Panaghiotti Pantaleon sought to turn his Greek Pantaleon Oriental Navigation Company into a British company, thereby confirming the effect of the boycott. 47 Several shops in different parts of Istanbul were forced to shut down due to boycotting actions. Most of them complained about the posters on their walls or windows, which they could not get rid of. Dimitri Grasas closed his two shops in Beşiktaş; Filanga and Mandilas closed their wine house and restaurants; the Habiri Brothers closed their grocery in Beylerbeyi/Üsküdar; and Nikola Arayoyoani, Dimitri Borla and Nikola Galanis closed their stores in different part of Istanbul.
48
A Greek leather merchant, Grigor Aleksiyu, had to close down his shop in Edremit/Hüdavendigar due to the pressures of the boycotters and, one year on, diplomatic and administrative correspondence related to his case was still ongoing.
49
The boycott was generally announced via public placards hung in various parts of Ottoman towns. For instance, in Selanik/Thessaloniki, at the very beginning of the boycott, a notice in Turkish and French was placed in various parts of the town. The declaration on walls invited patriotic citizens to defend their country and defined what a boycott really was. 50 The Greek newspaper Proodos complained about the posters that were plastered all over Bursa, as well as about the leaflets that were playing on the emotions of the Muslim public.
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The government was still receiving complaints from the Greek embassy concerning provocative posters in 1911. The boycott movement and the means of publicising the targets went hand in hand. The Boycott Society generally announced its targets and the society's goals in newspapers. 52 However, the boycott movement on the whole insisted on using posters, since that made 53 Fliers calling on the "Ottoman people" to boycott were distributed in Manastır/Bitola. Although these handbills were not stamped as registered, and were therefore illegal, they were openly distributed; the officials did not intervene, according to the report of the French consul. 54 These fliers were widely used during the boycott to propagate the goals of the movement. The names of the Greek merchants and shops were usually announced in the newspapers, but these kinds of leaflet were used to galvanise the sentiments of the public. One such handbill disseminated by the boycotters in Kala-i Sultaniye asked Muslims to cut their relationships with the Greek merchants. This caused panic among the Greek population of the town.
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Social mobilisation for class interest
These direct actions and demonstrations have, to a great extent, been neglected in Turkish historiography, and the National Economy (milli iktisat) is still largely considered to be a political ideology or political project applied from above. Milli iktisat was the name of a political, economic and social project that aimed to create an economy and industry independent from the domination of foreign capital in the Ottoman Empire. It had Ottomanist connotations just after the 1908 Revolution and also involved non-Muslims. However, after the Balkan Wars, milli iktisat became a nationalist idea and policy that addressed only the Muslims and Turks. One of its main goals was the creation of a Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie. It played a vital role in the elimination of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. 56 Although the historiography on Turkey highlights the actions of the state elite and the Committee of Union and Progress in the making of milli iktisat in an elitist vein, it also possessed a social dimension. The mobilisation of the public, in the form of the imposition of the boycott, was a significant aspect of the construction of the national economy; such actions have been taken into account only as acts of small nationalist gangs, but, in fact, a variety of different sections of society were active during the elimination of the Greeks. The British ambassador in Athens pointed out that the boycott in the empire was the desire of certain merchants who wanted to profit at the expense of Greek trade. 57 A year later, he again referred to the interests of Turkish and Jewish ship owners and their interests in the anti-Greek mobilisation. 58 The reports of the French consul in Selanik/Thessaloniki also confirm the British observation regarding the Turkish and Jewish merchant class: he wrote several times that they were attempting to replace Greek navigation between Ottoman ports. 59 In a similar vein, the Greek ambassador and the local Greek consuls also claimed that the boycott was a weapon used by the local merchants and notables to serve their personal interests. 60 Üngör also underlines in his conclusion in this issue the significance of personal and local business interests in the case of Diyarbakır.
The lightermen, stevedores, porters and boatmen were highly active in the anti-Greek mobilisations. These port workers were the main actors and the most organised social group of the movement, and also used it to press for their economic and social rights. They made use of nationalist mobilisation to consolidate their position vis-à-vis the state, the trading companies and the Port Company. They were basically defending their rights in the ports.
For instance, on 3 April 1910 the boatmen of Haifa demanded three times the sum they had agreed upon with the passengers, halfway between the shore and the steamer. Other boatmen came to their aid when passengers wanted to take boats to the steamer on their own. The travellers were desperate when they encountered an organised group of boatmen. Two of the offending boatmen were arrested and the case was brought to court. However, from the point of view of the consuls, the inquiry was unsatisfactory because the boatmen were soon released again. As the British consul in Beirut underlined, the boatmen were an organised body in all Levantine ports, and such an unsuccessful inquiry might be "a dangerous precedent highly discreditable to any Government." 61 The boatmen utilised these mass mobilisations and national campaigns in order to strengthen their place in the ports and improve their social conditions. Thanks to their boycotting activities, they consolidated their position vis-à-vis the state, the trading companies, and the Port Company. Direct actions of port workers in the form of strikes were restricted by the state and the political elite. The legal regulations such as the law on strikes, which had been issued in 1909, and the interference of the Committee of Union and Progress was an obstacle for such actions. Therefore, boycott and nationalist mobilisations offered the chance for the port workers to defend their rights in a nationalist framework. Their active presence in the movement facilitated the confirmation of their traditional rights in the ports. The Governor-General of Yanya and the governor of Preveze asked the Public Administration of Customs about the legal status of the port workers. If the workers were not organised as guilds and were paid wages in return for their work, they should be considered officials -that is to say, they could not participate in the boycott movement, since they would be part of the state apparatus. However, if they were organised as a guild and worked for fees, they could operate a monopoly in the ports and customs. 62 The Ministry of the Interior tried to undermine the boatmen's traditional rights, since their social power instilled fear in the elites. They had good reason to be afraid. The Cretan porters in Smyrna, for instance, considered the boycott a suitable occasion to call a strike against the shipping agents and lighter owners. This was an opportunity to abolish an agreement made by the government on their behalf, which limited the number of Muslims among the porters to one third of their total number. 63 The British consul in Smyrna reported that the Governor-General of the province of Aydın considered summoning the boycott leaders and threatening them with punishment based on the law on strikes. 64 Clearly, the governor also considered a significant part of the boycott activities as workers' actions.
In the end, the Ministry of the Interior was unable to limit the monopoly of the port workers. The Administration of Customs confirmed the monopoly rights of the port workers one month later. 65 The Ministry of Naval Affairs also affirmed the rights of the lightermen, stating that foreign companies did not have any rights of transportation. 66 This monopoly was the main pillar of the social power of the porters and lightermen, and accounts for the numerous incidents of porters on the Ottoman quays threatening others who had been newly hired by foreign companies. In Jaffa, the old porters who were traditionally organised in their guilds and had their own network in the ports pushed the ones that were newly hired by the companies into the sea. 67 Irrespective of their power, the port workers were losing money because of the anti-Greek boycott movement, since they did not have a fixed income and their wages depended on the amount of work they did. In most towns, they were the only social group that fought for the boycott, even though they lost wages when they refused to unload goods and passengers from the ships. One source of revenue that they did have was the certificates printed in order to prove merchants' Muslim identity. These certificates were sold for ten piastres and provided a small income for the movement. Moreover, the inspection teams of the Boycott Organisation, who inspected the shops and stores, were said to force merchants to "pay for their protection against boycottage." These sources of income did support the livelihood of the port workers to a certain extent. 68 The boycott organisations also established a fund in order to support the port workers. 69 Moreover, there were initiatives to raise money for the benefit of the port workers. The inhabitants of Mustafapaşa in Istanbul collected 328 piastres and at the very beginning of the boycott handed over the sum to the porters and boatmen in order to support them. Proodos guessed that these donations might have increased in the later phases of the boycott movement. 70 The foreign consuls and the non-Turkish press despised the port workers and claimed that it was a disgrace for the Ottoman state to leave politics and diplomatic affairs in the hands of porters and lightermen. 71 For instance, Kerim Ağa, the head of the Selanik/Thessaloniki porters, was portrayed in the Greek press as if he was the master of commerce in the Ottoman Empire. He was depicted in illustrations and cartoons as an ugly Oriental figure, sitting on a pillow, smoking a water-pipe, and giving orders to the workers around him. 72 In a short period of time, he became one of the most famous people in the empire. He was regularly mentioned in the political and popular press and became the subject of diplomatic correspondence. Several times he was detained and sent to jail, but he did not lose his power in the port of Selanik or his influence over other ports in the empire. His relationship with the cup and his position as head of the most powerful guild of the empire facilitated his dominance in trade. Likewise, the heads of the port workers elsewhere became prominent figures of their towns in this period. For example, in Antalya, where a large number of Cretan immigrants were living, Süllü Ağa and Fehim Ağa emerged as significant political and social agents. They not only played a crucial role in the anti-Greek boycotts, but also made their struggle part of the nationalist movement, even in the Armistice Period after World War One. 73 Apart from their class interest in the ports and their stance against the foreign companies, there is enough evidence to suggest that Muslim porters actively participated in such social movements in order to get rid of non-Muslim colleagues and dominate their trade.
Conclusion
The social mobilisation against the Greek Orthodox population that came about after the 1908 Revolution was the economic aspect of a process that aimed to eliminate non-Muslims from the Ottoman Empire. It was part and parcel of the Milli İktisat (National Economy) project that gradually became hegemonic throughout this period. The mobilisation of the Muslim/Turkish public formed the social base of the Milli İktisat, and reveals the fact that elimination of non-Muslims was not solely a political project. Social mobilisation generated the social force behind Milli İktisat thought and Turkish nationalism in general. This process turned it from an abstract idea into a social reality, thanks to different patterns of mobilisation. First, the rulers and elites of the Ottoman state were no longer satisfied with consolidating the consent of the people and public opinion after the 1908 Revolution. Mere confirmation of loyalty on the part of the people was not enough, and a different pattern of mobilisation from above was put in place, through which the political elite tried to control the society and orient it towards their high politics. Different political groups and competing sections of the ruling elite, from the higher bureaucrats to organisations such the cup, strove to govern society using this kind of controlled mobilisation of the Muslim public. As I have tried to show here, various instruments from the universal toolbox of social movements, from organised demonstrations to direct actions such as picket lines, placards, posters, fliers, leaflets and pamphlets, were efficiently utilised in this process. On the other hand, as I have sought to highlight, the mobilisation of different sections of society was not totally controlled by the political elite: various social classes, such as merchants and workers, mobilised themselves from below, and these movements had their own dynamics. Their motivations and interests within the anti-Greek mobilisation meant that they could not simply be herded from above. Without taking into account these different patterns and instruments of social mobilisation, it is hard to grasp the different aspects of the elimination of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire at the outset of the twentieth century. 
